A Path to Ensure that the U.S. Air Traffic Control System is Unaffected by Future Government Shutdowns
The recent shutdown, like those in the past, had a significant impact on air travel. Approximately 14,000 Federal Aviation Administration air traffic controllers and 4,800 technicians responsible for maintenance of the air traffic system infrastructure worked without pay. The FAA also furloughed other personnel responsible for system oversight and air traffic control support functions. As a result, staffing issues during the shutdown stressed the air traffic control system that normally manages approximately 45,000 flights each day.
Based on its analysis of operational data, the FAA restricted the number of flights at major airports, triggering significant delays and cancellations that inconvenienced passengers and increased costs for the nation’s airlines. Delays and cancellations were prominently in the news and, in some cases, cited as arguments to end the shutdown. Capacity reductions did not eliminate all shutdown-related safety issues, however. And safety concerns persisted once the shutdown was resolved.
The FAA has historically experienced chronic staffing shortages among its cadre of air traffic controllers. A report issued by the National Academy of Sciences in June 2025 found that staffing levels at approximately one-third of the FAA’s air traffic control facilities were at least 10 percent below target at that time. The government shutdown has exacerbated this problem by accelerating the attrition of qualified controllers and making the recruitment of new controllers more difficult. The cumulative effect is that the FAA’s staffing challenges have become more severe due to the shutdown and will continue now that the government has reopened.
In addition, working conditions that created fatigue and stress among controllers during the shutdown have the potential to undermine FAA’s organizational culture, which encourages controllers and other operational personnel to voluntarily report safety-related concerns. As a result, there is a residual risk that safety issues may go unreported in the future.
The shutdown also affected FAA’s ability to conduct effective oversight of air traffic control operations. The FAA is both the operator and overseer of the air traffic control system. Because of this organizational structure, FAA’s oversight of its Air Traffic Organization – the part of the agency responsible for air traffic control services – differs from its oversight of the airlines and other aviation entities. While the FAA recognizes that financial difficulties and labor strife are risk factors requiring enhanced surveillance of the nation’s airlines, it does not have similar protocols to increase oversight of its own operations when funding gaps force controllers and other operational personnel to work without pay.
Finally, the government shutdown may have also affected FAA’s ability to update safety-critical infrastructure. Earlier this year, communications and surveillance system outages caused safety incidents at Newark’s Liberty International Airport and the Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center. System-wide infrastructure improvements depend on FAA employees who support the procurement and installation of much-needed system upgrades, many of whom were furloughed during the shutdown.
While future shutdowns may be inevitable, their impact on the country’s air traffic control system can be avoided. Establishing an air traffic service provider independent of the FAA can ensure that air travel is unaffected by future government shutdowns and other political influences.
Other countries have realized capacity and safety benefits by separating their air traffic service providers from their regulatory authorities. As a senior official at the International Civil Aviation Organization, I supported those separation initiatives to ensure effective and independent oversight. Implementing that strategy in the U.S. will provide the added benefit of insulating the air traffic control system from the political implications of future government budget impasses.
One potential solution is to privatize the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization. While privatization has been considered multiple times over the years, it has failed to obtain buy-in from the airline industry and other stakeholders. But privatization is only one of multiple strategies that can be used to create a separate air traffic service provider.
Therefore, the first step is to recognize that the status quo creates avoidable risks to the air transportation system and to build consensus on the need for organizational change. Once the aviation community agrees to move forward, proposals for the air traffic control organization of the future should include all workable alternatives, including establishment of a public-private partnership or a federally chartered corporation.
Whatever the structure, the FAA must undergo organizational change to ensure that the capacity and safety of the air traffic control system are unaffected by future government shutdowns. Air traffic controllers, technicians, and others providing safety-critical support functions must be able to perform their duties without any effect on their pay, working conditions, and training.