ATC Safety
It is time for the Federal Aviation Administration to enhance its oversight of the nation’s air traffic control system. This year alone, there have been multiple accidents involving commercial air operators, including the deadliest U.S. air disaster since 2001 – a fatal midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. The investigation of that accident has identified technical and procedural issues, and the FAA is taking actions to resolve them. For example, the FAA is changing or eliminating helicopter routes to reduce the risk of midair collisions near Reagan airport. While these tactical measures can effectively mitigate risks associated with specific operating environments, there are also systemic issues that point to the need for more effective oversight of the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization; the U.S.-designated air traffic service provider.
To be fair, the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization has implemented numerous programs to assure the safety of aircraft operating in the nation’s airspace. But these initiatives alone are not adequate considering the anticipated growth in air traffic and the introduction of new aviation technologies into the National Airspace System. The FAA must also undergo strategic changes for it to conduct more effective oversight of the agency’s Air Traffic Organization.
First, organizational changes are required to ensure that oversight of the air traffic control system is conducted by an independent authority. The FAA is currently responsible for the operation and oversight of the U.S. air traffic control system – a dual role that has the potential to undermine the agency’s ability to oversee its own operations. This organizational structure can create conflicts of interest as the FAA needs to balance the aviation industry’s demand for additional capacity with safety measures that may require increased aircraft separation. Therefore, any strategy to improve the safety the U.S. air traffic control system must necessarily include organizational changes to ensure that FAA’s oversight responsibilities are separated from its operational functions.
Other countries have recognized the benefits of separating air traffic service providers from the organizations responsible for oversight of their operations. Some countries, such as Canada, have privatized their air traffic service providers – a strategy that has enhanced oversight and made their air traffic systems more efficient. But privatization is not the only option. For example, the United Kingdom’s air traffic service provider is a public-private partnership separate from its aviation regulator. In other cases, regulators and air traffic service providers coexist as separate government entities. Regardless of the strategy used, separating air traffic service providers from their respective regulatory authorities has enhanced oversight and yielded real safety benefits.
Organizational changes of this magnitude will be complex and will require Congressional approval. But this type of change is not unprecedented. In the past, Congress has taken actions to evolve the organizations responsible for aviation oversight in response to fatal accidents. The Department of Commerce was originally responsible for oversight as part of its mandate to promote safe expansion of the aviation industry. In 1938, following a spate of fatal accidents, an independent Civil Aeronautics Authority was established to enhance aviation safety oversight. In 1956, a midair collision involving two airliners killed all 128 people on board. Two years later, Congress created the Federal Aviation Agency (now the Federal Aviation Administration) and gave it responsibility for regulation of aviation safety as well as the operation of the nation’s air traffic control system. The midair collision in Washington, the deadliest aviation accident in the U.S. since 2001, is indicative of the need for Congress to consider organizational changes that clearly separate FAA’s current operational and oversight responsibilities.
Second, the FAA must ensure that the Air Traffic Organization is subject to the rigorous and independent oversight applicable to other providers of aviation products and services. U.S. airports, commercial air operators, aircraft manufacturers, maintenance organizations, and flight training organizations must comply with stringent regulatory requirements to obtain FAA approval or certification. FAA offices responsible for safety oversight continuously monitor these organizations to ensure that they comply with regulatory requirements associated with their approval or certification. When deviations occur, the FAA may require certificate holders to take corrective actions. If necessary, the FAA may also take enforcement actions including the suspension or revocation of operating certificates. As a result, oversight has been instrumental to the U.S. aviation industry’s sustained growth while simultaneously reducing the number of fatal accidents.
But the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization is not subject to the same level of oversight as other U.S. aviation service providers. Since the FAA is responsible for both the operation and oversight of the nation’s air traffic system, it has historically conducted oversight of its air traffic control operations through internal policies. As a result, the Air Traffic Organization is not required to comply with regulations used to certify and monitor other sectors of the aviation industry. Exacerbating this issue is the fact that a significant number of U.S. control towers are operated by private companies not subject to independent oversight processes. These contracted companies operate as many as 265 towers accounting for more than 17 million operations in 2023.
Recent events provide a compelling argument for independent and more extensive oversight of the nation’s air traffic system. It is therefore critical that Congress, the FAA, and industry stakeholders include safety oversight as part of the strategy to improve aviation safety. To be successful, changes of this nature must be executed strategically over several years, requiring consensus among government and industry stakeholders as well as continuity in FAA leadership – both of which have been elusive.